Turkey, Pickled in a Narrow Bottle

Turkey, Pickled in a Narrow Bottle. 

 

"Peace at home and peace abroad ", Kemal Ataturk.

 

"In Turkey no PM can keep his reign for more than a decade "Adnan Menderes (prime minister from 1950 to 1960), who was hanged in 1961 by the junta after the first coup d'état.

 

Erdogan was tried for utterances "Minarets are our bayonets, domes are our helmets, mosques are our barracks, believers are our soldiers," convicted and jailed for 4 months. He had also said "Thank God, I am for Shariah," "For us, democracy is a means to an end." and, "One cannot be a secularist and a Muslim at the same time."

 

No matter the outcome, the elections seem to spell an uncertain future for Turkey for an unfore seeable period.

 

The author ,who has kept a watch on secular republican Turkey since 1967 ,has been dismayed with the political processes and evolution of Turkey towards a dictatorial Islamist model ever since last elections in 2011 and specially since Erdogan became the president .He spent 10years in Turkey (1969-73,1992-1997 ), travelled from coast to coast, along its borders except with Iran and found Turks , honest , upright , proud , warm and hospitable . 

 

I had misgiving even in Nov 2002 when ,AKP led by Erdogan gate crashed on the political arena with 2/3^rd majority with 34% votes only .Erdogan was debarred from that election .The electoral system with 10% threshold was introduced in post 1980 coup to bring in stability.

 

Internally Erdogan has painted himself in a corner going after followers of soft Islamic leader and ally Fatheullah Gulen residing in USA, many founders of AKP itself , once powerful military ,humiliated and insulted ,whose hundreds of senior officers were jailed ,judiciary and secular forces .Media has been suppressed perhaps  now in the worst state than anywhere .Few are rooting for Erdogan, not even corporate, US led Western media. Pin drop expectations  !

 

Externally Ankara has bad to worse relations with almost all in the neighbourhood and even beyond .Turkey is behind ISIS in league with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and US led West . Saudi and Gulf Green money ie Yesil Surmaye has supported Erdogan .Ankara has given almost full support to ISIS.

 

Below is a very good description by a veteran  Turkish journalist , of the possible electoral outcome and serious possible ramifications, affecting internal peace and external relations.

 

K.Gajendra Singh 6 June 2015, Delhi

 

 

Will the elections bring the end of the 'Erdogan era'?

Around 60 million people are eligible to vote in Turkey, and between 85 to 90% of them are predicted to vote on June 7. Approximately 50 million people will be deciding not only their own country's destiny but also, to a certain extent, the future of the Middle East where Turkey has an important role to play because of its unique geopolitics.

 

 The rising fortunes of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party may mean the beginning of the end of the "Erdogan era."

 

Author Cengiz ÇandarPosted June 5, 2015

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/turkey-elections-preamble-to-the-end-of-erdogan-era.html

 

No matter the outcome, the elections seem to spell an uncertain future for Turkey for an unforeseeable period.

 

There are two main alternatives for the Turkish electorate to decide, and each has a number of subtexts in itself:

 

Either larger-than-life Erdogan will receive a green light to achieve his quest for an increasingly autocratic rule through his enhanced status, or:

 

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will lose its grip on power, unable to form a single-party government as it has managed to since 2002. Thus, it will be the beginning of the end of Erdogan's ambitions and ultimately his political demise.

 

The first alternative seemingly will preserve the status quo for the power holders, but it does not mean a recipe for Turkey's stability. On the contrary, it would push the country to implosion under the increasingly intolerable harsh rule of Erdogan and his party and within the broader context in the already volatile region where violence grips more and more of Syria and Iraq.

 

Many international media outlets and Turkey experts largely see the elections as a referendum for Erdogan and the ruling party because of the aforementioned reasons. A victory for the president will set Turkey on the path of instability with potentially dangerous outcomes. 

 

The second alternative is a shortcut for a political crisis — the duration of which and how it would unfold cannot be predicted: The ruling AKP may be unable to secure a simple majority in the parliament. In other words, it will earn less than 276 seats out of 550. This scenario was highly unlikely until a few weeks ago. 

​

Most of the latest opinion polls, which could not be publicized over the last 10 days due to the ban on media coverage, suggest that the second alternative is more feasible. KONDA, believed to be one of the most accurate and credible polling companies despite its blunder in the last presidential elections, presented its latest findings to its customers privately. The following is its final forecast with an error margin of 2.4 points: The ruling AKP's share of the vote is 41%; the main opposition Republican People's Party's (CHP) is 27.8%; the Nationalist Movement Party's (MHP) is 14.8%; and the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party's (HDP) is 12.6%.

 

According to KONDA's CEO, the ruling party may earn 270 to 278 seats with such an outcome. This means the AKP — aka Erdogan — may secure a thin majority over the required 276 seats, but they won't be able to rule Turkey as they wish. The distribution of 1 million votes cast by Turkish expats will also help to decide the ultimate result.

 

 

A&G, another opinion poll company with a relatively good reputation, also leaked its findings on June 4. The company conducted its last survey on June 2-3 in 42 provinces with these results: AKP 42%, CHP 27%, MHP 16%, and HDP 12%.

 

The trends are best understood thanks to the non-Turkish James in Turkey's study. It published "a rolling average of the last five polls published by known Turkish pollsters," weighing the result with the previous five polling results. In their words, this helps to "give an idea of the trend in support while protecting the average against extreme outlier results."

 

According to the study, the AKP's average share of the vote was 46.2%; while HDP's was 8.5% on Jan. 15, these figures respectively became 44.2% and 9.9% on April 17; 42.6% and 10.2% on May 1; and 40.9% and 10.8% on May 29. Finally, by June 5, just 48 hours prior to the elections, the AKP's share of the vote seems to be 41.1% and HDP's is 11.2%.

 

All of the figures indicate that the pro-Kurdish HDP succeeded in attracting the Turkish left, religiously conservative Kurds who had voted for the AKP in the 2002, 2007 and 2011 elections, and disaffected liberals who had voted for the AKP or the CHP in the past.

 

This has been partly thanks to the attraction of its young and articulate leader, Selahattin Demirtas. There is almost a consensus that the party will manage to achieve "mission impossible" by getting over the immensely undemocratic 10% national threshold.

 

Such a success is proportional with the AKP losing its simple majority. Hence, the HDP's getting over the 10% threshold would mean at least the beginning of the end of the Erdogan era.

The HDP's estimated election success can only be prevented by major electoral fraud or rigging, and this is not totally out of the question.

 

Otherwise, any fair election is likely to conclude with the ruling AKP losing its simple majority. That would pave the way for various coalition scenarios. The likeliest is the AKP-MHP coalition government. But this possible coalition may not be able to last long in the face of a looming economic crisis.

Another scenario is that if no government can be formed within 45 days after the elections, then constitutionally the country has to hold new elections. This could give Erdogan the opportunity to campaign for stability, and the electorate is likely to heed his advice. But this could even be more costly for him and his ambitions. Once the erosion of his power starts, nobody can forecast where and how it would stop.

 

International financial circles seem to already have accepted the election results, and they predict no positive outcome. The Wall Street Journal's article titled "Investors Lose Appetite for Turkey Before Polls" reads, "Foreign investors are looking ahead to Turkey's parliamentary elections on Sunday with concern, fearing any outcome that could destabilize the economy." The article also quotes a portfolio manager as follows: "If the AKP wins an absolute majority, then we might consider liquidating our position in Turkey completely."

 

For many citizens of Turkey, notwithstanding the uncertainties the elections may lead to, the most important outcome would be to see whether the beginning of the end of the Erdogan era will commence. For those citizens, nothing is more important than that, and nothing will be more comforting for the future of the country.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/turkey-elections-preamble-to-the-end-of-erdogan-era.html#ixzz3cGfmZCuB

Re: Silk Routes versus Sea Lanes

Silk Routes versus Sea Lanes

The Return of Landlubbers

http://www.epw.in/strategic-affairs/silk-routes-versus-sea-lanes.html

 

The Chinese strategy is to build rail and road links over the Eurasian landmass to escape the vice-like grip over maritime trade routes exercised by the United States and its allies. An exploration of the possible consequences, drawing on history, for China, the Western powers, India and the global trade and military architecture.

Atul Bhardwaj (atul.beret@gmail.com) is ICSSR Senior Fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi.

Grapes from Astana can reach Amritsar in just 28 hours by train through Pakistan—a fact recently reinforced by an economist from Tajikistan¹ in his talk about land routes connecting Central Asia to India. A few years ago, the idea itself would have been relegated as impractical to a mind conditioned to think of international trade as synonymous with ships and sea lanes of communication (SLOC). Until, of course, the Chinese proposed their signature idea of "One-Belt-One-Road" (OBOR) which is fast gaining currency.

For long, the Chinese story was devoid of ideas that could develop an emotional rapport with the world. OBOR has injected a new dimension to the Chinese growth narrative. The primary aim of OBOR is to connect China with Europe through Central Asia and Russia. The purpose is to limit the maritime component in the global supply chain and thereby reduce dependence on the international merchant fleet of bulk carriers and tankers.

Beijing understands that making Southeast Asia the world's factory and building international financial infrastructure like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are not adequate to lead the global economy, what is equally important is control over the channels through which business travels.

Rediscovering Land

On 9 December 2014, a cargo train which started its journey from the manufacturing hub of Yiwu (close to Shanghai) reached the Spanish city of Madrid covering about 8,000 miles. The world's longest rail journey passed through China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany and France. It took 21 days to complete this maiden journey, less than half the time it takes to travel by sea. According to freight experts (Ian 2014),

sending a 10-tonne 40-foot container from Chengdu, China, to Lodz, Poland, takes 12 to 14 days by train, compared to several days by plane (if you include customs and delivery on each end) and some six weeks or longer by boat. The price tag comes to some $40,000 by air, compared to $10,000 by train, and as low as $5,000 by boat.

As the length of the train increases and more powerful engines are added, time and costs are likely to fall considerably. Several other Chinese manufacturing centres are already connected to the German cities of Hamburg and Duisburg and to Rotterdam in the Netherlands. This time–space compression is ushering in a new phase of globalisation that promises to be more inclusive than the previous ones.

OBOR is not purely land based; it also has a maritime component. The ports and harbours in Indonesia, Africa, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and possibly India are part of the scheme to shorten sea time that the to-and-fro trade from West Asia and Africa has to traverse to reach China. This ensures that China-bound oil first lands at Gwadar port in Pakistan or at Kyaukphyu port in Myanmar, from where it is carried through tankers, pipelines and rail network to western China, thus opening up new vistas to create wealth for populations all along routes that have remained backward for centuries.

Generally, ocean trade between two ports bypasses many nations along the passage. For example, oil coming from West Asia to China using the conventional SLOCs is largely a bilateral transaction that benefits few littorals en route. OBOR, backed by $140 billion funds, is creating a comprehensive network of ports, railways and roads that would open up new business synergies all along the route.

The question is, why is China diversifying trade routes? Why cannot the Chinese continue to use the well-established SLOCs? If their goods can easily ply on relatively peaceful high seas then why do they want to move them through well-populated national territories? Why are the Chinese increasing their vulnerabilities by increasing the number of stakeholders along the proposed trade routes? One plausible answer is that Chinese trade does not feel safe using American-dominated SLOCs. An economic reason could be the desire to garner a greater share in the global service sector that is currently under American dominance.

Reopening the old silk route is an open defiance of the American "command of the commons." Commanding the commons entails controlling the $375 billion shipping industry and the shipping insurance and reinsurance business, that includes vessel hull, war risk and cargo insurance premiums. This business has been the bedrock of the Western dominance of the world. The Chinese challenge is non-confrontationist, to the extent that it does not involve naval battles to physically dethrone the United States (US) from the command.

This raises an obvious question, if China is turning its back on the oceans then why is it investing in building a blue water navy? The Chinese are building more surface ships than submarines because they see medium navies as a diplomatic force that is used more for advancing flag showing than fighting wars. According to media reports, China plans to have 351 ships by 2020 and every year it is building or launching roughly 60 naval ships. The Chinese are building warships merely as a show of capability much in the same fashion as the US had built a large cruiser in 1925, merely to puncture British naval vanity. Another reason seems to be to induce America to spend more on its navy.

The Chinese also do not seem to want to meddle with the well-protected Anglo–American insurance markets. The Chinese strategy hinges on bringing down the usage of oceans for trade. Once trains and road links become extensive, global trade will not employ 55,000 ships to move cargo. Lower volumes will lead to a sharp fall in the revenue generated from insurance and reinsurance premiums that accrue to the Western world and also have an impact on the derivatives market at the London-based Baltic Exchange. Reduced trade through oceans will automatically lead to decline in the importance of Western navies. This would hit the maritime nations hard. The pain will aggravate when Chinese capital creates more favourable insurance and reinsurance regimes and fragments the market along the new trade routes that it is creating.

Exporting Development Models

Many analysts have compared OBOR investments with the $17 billion Marshall Plan that the US had executed for Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II. However, the two are fundamentally different because the historical context in which the Marshall Plan was conceived is totally at variance with circumstances in which OBOR is germinating. The former was a by-product of war and a superpower's geostrategic game to contain the Soviet footprint in Europe by giving a fillip to Western war-devastated economies. On the other hand, OBOR is promoted by China, which is not yet a superpower and is not using war surpluses to catapult itself to a hegemonic position. The Chinese initiative is more towards creating a multipolar world by breaking the Anglo–Saxon vice-like grip over global trade.

When America was at the stage where China is today, they talked about the need for political reform in the world. Promoting anti-colonialism and cultural nationalism in the 1940s, established America on a moral high ground. The only tangible economic model of development that depression-ravaged America gave to the world was the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). TVA, a multipurpose river valley development project, introduced new techniques in flood control and exploitation of vast water resources for electricity generation. It was a mixed economy model that helped "restructure capitalism through Keynesian inspired state-directed planning," (D'Souza 2003: 86). It gave fresh impetus to industrialisation and dams became "symbols of modernisation, national prestige and of human dominance over nature" (Baghel and Nüsser 2010: 233). David E Lilienthal's book TVA: Democracy on the March was used to romanticise the concept and project it as an example of "grass-roots democracy."

In a matter of few years the idea of TVA reached India in the form of the Damodar Valley project. Its Chinese version was called the Yangtze Valley Authority (YVA) under Chiang Kai-shek. However, unlike OBOR, TVA was devoid of capital and all that the idea brought with it was American experts and multinational companies to draw money out from former colonies.

The twin factor that differentiates China's rise from that of the US is the role that the American military and private capital played in influencing the contours of the postcolonial order. America emerged on the global stage after two bloody wars. The entire post-war planned development and industrialisation model that America introduced to the world was designed to cater to the war industry. Therefore, the American military–industrial complex played a massive role in shaping the post-war world order. Currently, the Chinese government has kept its Peoples' Liberation Army and its billionaires, who control 3% of Chinese wealth, on a tight leash.

When Britannica Ruled the Waves

To understand the nuances of the critical changes that China is introducing to the international political economy, one needs to peep into history; the way the British closed traditional land routes and introduced the notion of "landlocked" in transnational exchanges. As Nimmi Kurian argues in India-China Borderlands (2014: 30), the British security establishment created the concept of "buffer zones" on borders that "flew in the face of both economic logic and social reality."

China, a continental power in Asia, was dissuaded from using the Silk Road and forced to open its ports through a series of "Opium Wars" and the invasion of Tibet. China resisted but eventually relented due to domestic strife created by the decline in trade. For the British it was essential to use their navy to make ocean routes more attractive, because since the 18th century "navy and credit" had been the bulwark of their global reach (Kennedy 1981: 46). By the middle of the 19th century, the British lost monopoly over manufacturing with the rise of Germany, the US and Russia. In 1870 the United Kingdom (UK) contained 32% of the world's manufacturing capacity; this share was down to 15% by 1910 (Kennedy 1981: 47).

Undeterred by changed circumstances, the English used their capital to underwrite the ocean trade. They encouraged free trade and earned money by extending services like shipping, insurance, commodity-dealing, banking. By 1914 they had reached a stage where the Lloyds of London provided insurance cover to German merchantmen that were sunk by Royal Navy guns. The fall in international trade in the wake of the Great Depression of 1929 led to a fall in British annual earnings from shipping, commissions, insurance and overseas investments; they fell by some £250 billion (Kennedy: 53).

America is palpably perturbed by the development of the AIIB and the OBOR. These twin Chinese creations are likely to do to America what the two world wars and the Great Depression had done to Britain. These could reduce their share of global service trade, which currently is double that of China (Romei 2014). The reduced shipment of oil from West Asia to America due to the shale gas revolution and the growth in renewable energy avenues coupled with new trade routes will cause a severe dent in American revenues. It is for this reason that America is mobilising its allies to refrain from joining Chinese-led initiatives.

One wonders what America will do to stem the slide. Will America go to war, relying on the money and goodwill of its allies? The UK also entered the World War II on borrowed money—both India and the US extensively lent money and equipment to the UK to fight the War; which it won but Britain was bankrupted. Will India be the American ally in a misadventure that takes on China?

India's Stakes

It is indeed hard to understand the logic behind some analysts who are insisting that border security and settlement with China should take precedence over economic ties. In effect these analysts are suggesting that India should refrain from joining the OBOR initiative. In fact, it would be more relevant for India to first figure out what she stands to gain by sustaining the primacy of sea lanes of communication in global trade. Collectively, India neither has much stake in marine insurance and reinsurance industry nor is it a global shipbuilding hub that is likely to lose business due to opening up of land routes.

Unlike the British military officers, who raised the bogey of border disputes in order to close land routes and direct trade to the oceans, the India of the 21st century has no such commercial strategic objective to meet. Despite proximity to seas and a reasonably strong navy, India does not enjoy much leverage to guide ocean trade markets. Therefore, it is prudent for India to join the unlocking of borders, and seek fresh avenues to do business in an environment that is relatively free of its erstwhile colonial masters and their cohorts. It is in the interest of multipolarity that sea lanes are subjected to some competition by the land lanes.

Note

1 Khojamahmad Umarov, Department of Macroeconomic Research, Institute of Economic Studies of the Ministry of Economy and Trade, Republic of Tajikistan, talk at ICS, Delhi on 22 April 2015.

References

Baghel, R and M Nüsser (2010): "Discussing Large Dams in Asia after the World Commission on Dams: Is a Political Ecology Approach the Way Forward?", Water Alternatives, 3(2): 231–48.

D'Souza, Rohan (2003): "Damming the Mahanadi River: The Emergence of Multi-purpose River Valley Development in India (1943–46)," Indian Economic Social History Review, 40; 81.

Ian, Mount (2014): "Spain to China by Rail: A 21st Century Silk Road Riddled with Obstacles," Fortune, 24 December, available at http://fortune.com/2014/12/24/spain-china-rail-trade/accessed on 10 January 2015.

Kennedy, Paul M (1981): "Strategy versus Finance in Twentieth-Century Great Britain," The International History Review, Vol 3, No 1, January, pp 44–61.

Romei, Valentina (2014): "China and US Battle for Trade Leadership," Financial Times, 10 January, available athttp://blogs.ft.com/ftdata /2014/01/10/china-and-us-battle-for-trade-leadership/, accessed on 12 January 2015.

 

Turkey's General Elections ; Will it further erode its Secular Fabric and Affect its role in the Region

Turkish General Elections ; Will it further erode its  Secular Fabric and Affect its role in the Region

 

Whatever be the results of Turkey' parliament elections on 7 June, it will be a water shed both internally and in its foreign relations .Turkey could end in confusion and even chaos , which could affect its untenable foreign policy in the region with serious implication for the region and the world at large .

 

Two perceptive and significant articles .5 June , 2015 .Delhi

 

Will Turkish Voters Thwart Erdogan's Ambitions?

Interviewee: Gonul Tol, Director of the Center for Turkish Studies, Middle East Institute
Interviewer: Zachary Laub, Online Writer/Editor
June 4, 2015

http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkish-voters-thwart-erdogans-ambitions/p36606

Turkish voters will elect a new government on Sunday. After twelve years in power, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is not in danger of losing its majority, but President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's consolidation of power, economic slowdown, and regional crises have energized a new opposition. For the first time, the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) could temper the AKP's ambitions, chief among them its aim to endow the presidency, a largely ceremonial post, with executive powers. "The presidential system Erdogan has in mind has no checks and balances," says Gonul Tol, director of Turkish studies at the Middle East Institute, in Washington, DC. "The majority of the Turkish public is against it." Another AKP-led government would likely increase tensions with the European Union, Tol says.

What should observers of Sunday's elections know about the Turkish parliamentary system?

Turkish voters elect 550 deputies from 85 constituencies [electoral districts] to the parliament, Turkey's unicameral legislature that's elected every four years. We have proportional representation. The most important feature of the Turkish parliamentary system is its 10 percent electoral threshold, one of the highest in the world. If parties get less than 10 percent, their votes are transferred to the winning party in the losing parties' constituency.

For example, the pro-Kurdish HDP is strong in Diyarbakir, a Kurdish constituency. If this party gets 9.8 percent nationally, then HDP votes in the Diyarbakir district will go to the [runner- up there], which would be the AKP. If the HDP doesn't cross the threshold, all those seats will go to the ruling party.

Although we have a parliamentary system, the 1982 constitution granted vast powers to the president. The president can chair national security council and cabinet meetings and exercise parliamentary powers, but is not supposed to interfere in the day-to-day affairs of the government. But Erdogan does. We have a de facto presidential system under Erdogan.

Apart from Erdogan's ambitions for a presidential system, there has been talk of the need for constitutional reform. How strong are checks and balances on the government?

On paper we have an independent judiciary, but it has never been independent, and since constitutional amendments in 2010, the government has greater control over the judiciary. President Erdogan and the AKP frequently interfere in judicial decisions.

There is little media freedom. There is self-censorship, and those who criticize the government often get fired. The AKP ran a liberal-democratic campaign when it first came to power, in 2002. They carried out important democratic reforms. But after thirteen years they have turned increasingly authoritarian.

If the AKP manages to capture a supermajority of 367 seats [it currently has 311], it will be able to change the constitution unilaterally. That means Erdogan would realize his dream of a presidential system. That does not bode well for Turkish democracy and Turkey's EU accession process. The presidential system Erdogan has in mind has no checks and balances.

It sounds like the HDP poses the biggest obstacle to an AKP supermajority, and its presidential ambitions. Is this role as power broker new for them?

Many criticized the pro-Kurdish HDP's decision to run as a party rather than field independent candidates, something it used to do to circumvent the 10 percent threshold. The Kurds think the HDP's decision to run as a party risks gains with the ongoing peace process and Kurdish role in the fight against the Islamic State. If the HDP cannot make the threshold, they won&#039t be represented in parliament.

But there's a bigger concern among liberals: If the HDP doesn't make it, what is at stake is not just the Kurdish peace process, but Turkish democracy. If the HDP doesn't make it to the parliament and the opposition parties [center-left] CHP and [ultranationalist] MHP do not increase their votes, the AKP could have a supermajority. But that is unlikely; polls suggest that the opposition parties will increase their votes.

The second-best scenario for the AKP is capturing 330 seats, the threshold to take a constitutional amendment to referendum. That is possible if the HDP fails and the opposition parties only slightly increase their votes. But even then, I think a presidential system is not possible. The majority of the Turkish public is against it.

The HDP's base is Kurdish, secular, and left leaning. Are they expanding their support this time around?

Kurdish voters have traditionally been split fifty-fifty. Fifty percent voted for the pro-Kurdish nationalist parties, and the other 50 percent voted for the center-right and conservative parties. In the Kurdish regions, there are two significant actors: the HDP and the AKP.

The HDP, if it wants to meet the threshold, has to appeal to conservative Kurds, traditionally the AKP's constituency. Since [the self-proclaimed Islamic State's siege of the Syrian border town] Kobani, many conservative Kurds have felt alienated. They thought the Turkish government was indifferent to the suffering of Kurds there. In recent months many conservative Kurds who traditionally voted for the AKP have joined the HDP.

The HDP did a great job appealing to the liberals and the young people in the CHP who are alienated by their own party, arguing that it has not been an effective opposition. [HDP leader] Selahattin Demirtas has presented his party as the liberal alternative to the AKP. They have lesbians, an Armenian, people from different social and ethnic backgrounds on their list of candidates.

There was a liberal void in Turkey in 2002, and the AKP filled that void. But it has lost that spirit of democratization. Now the HDP is rising up to fill that liberal void and it has captured the hearts and minds of young people concerned about the authoritarian drift of the country.

The challenge for Demirtas has been to balance those two constituencies. In polls, the HDP hovers between 9.8 and 10.3 percent, so it's right on the line.

A recent MetroPOLL suggests that around 10 percent of the AKP's constituency votes for pragmatic reasons. This 10 percent is now alienated. They think Erdogan's heavy hand, divisive arrest warrants, and flippant meddling in the economy are hurting political and economic stability. The HDP could capture some of these votes.

Economic growth had been impressive until slowing two years ago. Will Erdogan and the AKP bear blame for the slowdown at the polls?

Under the AKP, Turkey experienced impressive economic growth, the main reason it could hold onto power for so long. But that growth is now in decline, and part of the problem is a decline in investors' confidence. The Turkish economy is dependent on foreign investment. Erdogan has recently meddled in decisions of the Turkish central bank, a great concern for foreign investors. That has also hurt Erdogan.

The image of a country that does not respect the rule of law, where the judiciary is not independent, and where Erdogan, who has nontraditional views about finance and is constantly shaping economic policy, dealt a blow to Turkey's image. That is scaring away foreign investors.

The AKP came to power after the turbulent 1990s, when the country experienced many coalitions, economic crises, and political instability. The AKP could establish stability because, finally, there was a one-party government that could make effective decisions fast. Now that image is shattering, and people are feeling the economic downturn.

You spoke about the resonance of Kobani. In a broader sense, are voters concerned about regional turmoil?

They are. Syria occupies a unique place, not just in Turkey's Middle East policy, but in Turkey's domestic policy as well. Turkey's Kurdish policy has always been vulnerable to Syria's Kurdish policy. There are historical ties between the Kurdish communities on both sides of the border. There are family ties. They are organically linked.

Now, Syria is even more important because we have two million [Syrian] refugees, and Turkey does not have the legal and institutional infrastructure to handle them. They have become part of Turkey's social fabric forever. Many people are concerned about the economic, social, and political implications.

Another side of the story is the border towns. [Prior to the civil war] Syrians could go in and out of Turkey frequently. Trade has been hurt. And Syria had been Turkey's gate to Middle Eastern markets. They lost a lot of money in investments in Syria. Usually people don't vote on foreign policy, but it might have an influence because the government's Syria policy has been very unpopular.

Will the composition of the next government affect Turkey's regional policy?

The most likely outcome is the AKP won't capture a supermajority but will hold enough seats to form a majority government. In that case, I don't expect major changes in Turkey's regional policy. It has embarked on a more aggressive Syrian policy, pushing the United States to establish a no-fly zone and pursue a more forceful policy. But Turkey has mostly given up on the United States. Now it has formed an alliance with Saudi Arabia and Qatar to unify the Islamic Front.

Things could become worse vis-a-vis the European Union. If we have another AKP government, Turkey's democracy will suffer. Turkey already has a tense relationship with the EU, and in that case, the EU would be even more reluctant to normalize relations. European countries have been vocal in their criticism of Erdogan's meddling in the judiciary and the lack of freedom of expression.

If the HDP makes it to the parliament and the opposition parties significantly increase their votes, the AKP could be forced into a coalition government. The most likely scenario is an AKP coalition with MHP, the ultranationalist party. In that case, I think the AKP would be forced to be more inclusive and democratic. On the foreign policy front it might be more risk averse, but I don't see a big change.

But if the AKP forms a coalition with the pro-Kurdish HDP, we can expect a big change in Turkey's Syria policy. Turkey built its Syria policy on two objectives: toppling the regime and marginalizing the Kurds. They turned a blind eye to radical jihadi groups' activities within Turkey's borders, thinking they could be an effective fighting force not only against the Assad regime but against Syrian Kurds. If we see an HDP-AKP coalition, that will change. Turkey might be forced to engage the Kurds and engage less with the radical Islamist groups.

Turkey and Syria: The War of Two Men against One

By Jeremy Salt

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article42034.htm

June 03, 2015 "Information Clearing House" - "PalestineChronicle" - The next time Recep Tayyip Erdogan talks to the media perhaps he should be asked precisely where the Turkish national interest lies in the destruction of Syria.

In the name of bringing down the government in Damascus, Syria is being torn to pieces by groups armed, trained and financed by foreign governments. There is no real distinction between any of them. Jabhat al Nusra – Al Qaida in Syria – has the same ideological roots as the so-called Islamic State and is just as bloodthirsty and vicious. The so-called Free Syrian Army (FSA) is a collection of freebooters sucking up money and weapons from outside and crossing over to Jabhat al Nusra or the Islamic State or other groups with their weapons when it suits them. Jaish al Fatah (Army of Conquest) is a collective of takfiri groups that includes Jabhat al Nusra but alliances are fluid and subject to change. Sooner rather than later these groups could be expected to merge with the Islamic State, turning the central lands of the Middle East into one of the cruelest states the world has ever known.

The role played by Turkey in supporting this massive assault on a neighboring country is pivotal. The story begins with Libya. After hesitating, and declaring that outside military intervention anywhere in the Middle East would be disastrous, Recep Tayyip Erdogan threw his support behind the attack on Libya by the US, Britain and France. How support by an avowedly Muslim government for an attack on another Muslim country by western states squares with Islamic law and conventions is something for the scholars to explain. The overthrow of the Libyan government seems to have convinced Mr Erdogan and his then Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu that 'reform' was the wave of the future and they had better ride it: even better, position themselves on the crest of the wave towards the end of taking the lead in shaping the 'new' Middle East.

The next target on the agenda of the US-led collective which destroyed Libya was Syria. In 2012 Mr Erdogan and Mr Davutoglu positioned themselves at the forefront of the attack on the Syrian government, claiming that President Bashar al Assad had refused to listen to their pleas that he introduce 'reforms.' In fact, what they wanted, according to Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallim, was to bring the Muslim Brotherhood, a banned organization, into the ranks of government. Having failed to bring Bashar around to their way of thinking, Mr Erdogan and Mr Davutoglu decided to back the Syrian National Council (SNC) and its armed extension, the FSA. The SNC, a group of exiles with no known support in Syria, was provided with money and offices in Istanbul and the FSA with a base of operations in the southeast.

All doors were opened to the attack. Thousands of foreign takfiris streamed into Syria through Turkey while hundreds of thousands of Syrians trying to escape the fighting streamed into Turkey. Their numbers have now swelled to about 1.7 million, of whom about 300,000 live in refugee camps while the rest fend for themselves as best as they can in the southeast and across the country, begging in the streets, sleeping rough and being exploited as cheap labor. The camps are also host to Syrian takfiris, crossing the border during the past four years to fight and returning to the relative comforts of accommodation, food and heating provided by domestic and international aid agencies.

Apaydin is a 'refugee' camp only in name as it was set up solely for the senior figures in FSA. The attacks inside Syria directed by the FSA leadership inside Turkey include the assassination of senior figures in government offices in Damascus, with responsibility being claimed by the then head of the FSA, Riad al Assad, speaking from his base in Turkey.

In May 2014, bands of takfiris crossed the border to attack the Syrian Armenian town of Kassab. The people were driven out and their churches desecrated before the Syrian army drove them back across the border. While attacking takfiri positions a Syrian fighter jet was brought down by a Turkish missile attack. Turkey claims the jet crossed into Turkish air space but the fact is the pilot ejected and landed seven kilometers on the other side of the Syrian border. Like so much else about this war, the conflicting versions were not reconciled and soon fell out of the headlines.

Kassab was a minor public relations disaster for the Turkish government because of the connection immediately made around the world with the fate of the Armenians in 1915 but in no way did it persuade Mr Erdogan and Mr Davutoglu to back off after all the destruction and seek a peaceful solution to the crisis in Syria. Turkey is now said to have been closely involved in the recent takfiri seizure of the city of Idlib and the town of Jisr al Shughur, a hotbed of religious reaction for decades. In its complaint to the UN Security Council, the Syrian government alleges that the attack on the town was launched with intelligence support from Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar and says the takfiris were provided with weapons and training by Turkey. Thousands of men, many of them not 'rebels' at all but foreign fighters, including Chechens and Saudis, were involved in these attacks. The capture of Jisr al Shughur, in particular, was marked by trademark massacres in the town and nearby villages.

The loss of life and destruction in Syria has been immense but Mr Erdogan and Mr Dauvutoglu are clearly just as committed to the destruction of the government in Damascus as they were four years ago. They made continuation of their war against Bashar al Assad a condition of their participation in the campaign against the Islamic State. This campaign – such as it is – remains ambiguous and deeply suspect. Turkey is now training 'moderates' for the fight against the Islamic State: whether these armed men will actually serve this purpose once they cross the border remains to be seen. In any event there are no 'moderates' in Syria for them to join. The dominant fighting groups are all takfiri. The role played by the FSA is completely peripheral and to have any hope of changing the balance of power in favor of their notional 'moderates' the US and its allies would have train tens of thousands of men and not just a few thousand. Documents tabled in a Turkish court indicate that the Turkish national intelligence agency MIT has delivered truckloads of ammunition and weapons parts to areas of northern Syria under the control of one or another of these groups. This well-documented evidence has been dismissed out of hand by the Turkish government but reports continue of weapons material being shipped across the border into territory controlled by the Islamic State as well as other groups.

The US treats the Islamic State like an attack dog, restrained in Iraq where its interests (protection of the Kurdish state and its oil wealth) are threatened but let off the leash in western Iraq and Syria. The US did nothing to prevent the capture of Mosul last year and stood by again when the takfiris captured Ramadi recently and paraded through the streets in more captured US army pickups. Neither did it take any action to stop IS takfiris as they streamed across the desert in the direction of Palmyra. In both cases the takfiri columns were an open target which could have been obliterated from the air yet nothing was done to stop them.

A recently declassified Defence Intelligence Agency document exposes the truth. Dated August 2012, it points to the possibility of a 'salafist principality' being established in eastern Syria 'and this is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want in order to isolate the Syrian regime, which is considered the strategic depth of the Shia expansion (Iraq and Iran).' In other words the establishment of a takfiri state straddling the Iraqi and Syrian borders is part of US strategy, aimed at breaking up Iraq into a Kurdish state in the north, a takfiri state in the west and a rump Shia state in the south. Syria is intended to go the same way if the Alawi minority survives the takfiri attempt to destroy them.

No surprise here that this strategy is entirely consistent with the long-standing Zionist objective of breaking up the central lands of the Middle East into squabbling ethno-religious mini-states permanently in conflict with each other. Israel is right inside this war. It has signaled its preference for a takfiri regime in Damascus instead of the present government and has been giving the takfiris battlefield assistance and medical aid. Ehud Barak once fatuously described Israel as a villa in the jungle. In fact, Israel has spent 70 years doing its best to turn the Middle East into a jungle so that it can survive while everything around it dies. What we are witnessing is the complete reshaping of the Middle East in US, Israeli and Saudi interests.

The setbacks suffered by the Syrian army near the Turkish border appear linked to reports of closer collaboration between Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey aimed at blunting the advances of the Syrian army. Aleppo – those quarters infiltrated by the takfiris, including Chechens – seemed close to liberation until more forceful intervention by Syria's regional enemies. In Tadmur – the town next to the Palmyra ruins – hundreds of people were massacred as the takfiris took over.

It is not hard to understand why Israel, Saudi Arabia and the US want the Syrian government destroyed but it is very hard to understand how the destruction of the Syrian government and effectively of much of Syria – the destruction of human life, the destruction of cities, towns and villages and the destruction of Syria as a functioning state – ever suited anything that could be described as a Turkish national interest, whatever Mr Erdogan and Mr Davutoglu thought they were doing when they launched their campaign against Syria in 2012. Their apparent dream of a Middle East dominated by a neo-Ottoman Turkish republic has collapsed in the ruins of Iraq and Syria and the emergence of an Islamic State that threatens the stability of all regimes in the region.

The negatives can be ticked off one by one. Last year the border town of Reyhanli was bombed by the same people or the same type of people the government is now supporting in Syria, with great loss of life and destruction. Turkey has had to bear a large part of the cost of maintaining the flood of Syrian refugees. It has an expanding, brutal and extremely violent Islamic state just across its border. Cross-border trade has been killed off and relations damaged with worthwhile friends (Iraq, Iran and Russia) for the sake of relations with questionable ones (Saudi Arabia and Qatar). Border security has been wrecked and an even greater regional crisis could easily develop given Syria's strategic importance to Russia and Iran. Yet Mr Erdogan and Mr Davutoglu appear to want plunge in even deeper, following reports of friction with the army command over their reported wish for an open attack across the border towards direct and open involvement in Syria.

This war is unprecedented in Turkey's history. Never before has a Turkish government set out to destroy the government in a neighboring country, using means that would seem to put it in violation of international law. Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter stipulates that 'all member states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.' Article 2 (4) requires all UN members to refrain 'from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any manner inconsistent with this purpose.' In 1965 the UN General Assembly passed in resolution 2131 (XX) the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty. The text contains the following clauses:

1) No state has the right to intervene directly or indirectly for any reason whatever in the internal or external affairs of any state. Consequently armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements are condemned.

2) No state may urge or encourage the use of economic, political or any other types of measures in order to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind. Also, no state shall organize, assist or foment, finance or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state or engender civil strife in another state.

While new concepts have arisen since that time – especially 'responsibility to protect' and 'humanitarian intervention' – direct or indirect intervention in the affairs of other states without the authority of the UN does not have authoritative legal support. This remains the case even with the US-led intervention in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. One can also mention the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Training and Financing of Mercenaries, into which category would have to be put the armed men being trained with the support of the US in Jordan and Turkey. The fact that other states violate international law does not free Turkey from the responsibility of upholding it at every level.

Syria is a man-made catastrophe. Mr Erdogan and Mr Davutoglu had a range of choices before them. They could have chosen to hold Bashar al Assad to his word and make sure that free elections within a multiparty system were held (as they were eventually were anyway). They could have chosen to remain in the role of neutral but concerned arbitrators. They could even have chosen to do nothing but instead of picking up any of these options they chose violence behind the screen of support for 'rebels.' Their companions in the anti-Syrian collective include two of the most reactionary and undemocratic governments in the world, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This is Mr Erdogan's 'new Turkey.'

This is a wrong war morally, legally and politically. It is a dirty war whose full dimensions remain mostly hidden despite everything that is known about it. It is the most relentless and vicious war waged against an Arab government in the past two centuries. The destruction of Syria has paved the way for the rise of some of the most chillingly brutal people in modern history. There is no perceptible Turkish national interest in this war unless serving the interests of the US, Israel and backwards Gulf States (with lots of money) can be described as a national interest. It is not the war of the Turkish people but the war of two men against one man. This is a war driven by ego, ambition and the macho determination of Tayyip Erdogan to destroy Bashar al Assad. Napoleon dreamt of riding an elephant into Central Asia, a turban on his head and an emerald in the turban. Of what does Tayyip Erdogan dream? Walking into the Umayyad mosque in Damascus to the cheers of the multitudes? If ever he does, behind him will lie the wreckage of Syria and the scattering to the four winds of Ataturk's slogan – 'peace at home and peace in the world.'

Jeremy Salt is an associate professor of Middle Eastern history and politics at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com.

 

 

Re: A war is at our doorsteps.Mad Armageddon ?

Many serious political thinkers and strategic experts have been warning of USA , afraid of losing dollar monopoly and perhaps its collapse , of nuclear brink manship , which might lead to MAD Armageddon .Below is a serious and sobering article . It is a frightening scenario.

 

A war is at our doorsteps. As usual, we need another year.

5180 ViewsMay 02, 2015 107 Comments

by Rostislav Ishchenko

translated by Eugenia

http://thesaker.is/a-war-is-at-our-doorsteps-as-usual-we-need-another-year/

 

Alexander the Blessed needed an extra year to finish the war with Turkey, train already drafted recruits, and deploy at the Western border against Napoleon not 200 thousand, but half a million-strong army, which would not have bothered to retreat into the heart of the Empire.

Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin needed another year to complete the technical upgrade of the army, formation of motorized units, and deployment at the border of the force capable of meeting the enemy on equal terms.

That by itself does not mean that thus deployed forces would have necessarily fought successfully. In 1809, Austrians and in 1939-1940 French and British had more than enough time and resources to deploy against Napoleon and Hitler, respectively, having forces at least equal, and in some ways superior to their armies. Austrians in 1809 as well as French and British in 1939-1940 had the initiative – they decided when to choose offensive or defensive action. In both cases, the defeats due the superior strategy of the Napoleon and Hitler Joint Staff were catastrophic.

Nevertheless, we all agree that before the war it is better to have an extra year than not to have it. The better you prepare for the war, the better you chances are to win it. Most importantly, your victory would come without an enormous cost in human lives and moral losses, which, as a rule, accompany wars started with failures.

This time we again need approximately a year

Ten years ago, in 2005 I had a conversation with a colleague of mine – an expert in economics and finances. I always valued his opinions, because he, a person of liberal views, was not dogmatic, but capable of reasonable evaluation of the system's faults and often was able to describe its problem with more precision than the most able of its Marxist opponents.

Our discussion was focused on the inevitable (we both agreed on that) crisis of the dollar. I argued that the crisis is already happening, but Washington still has the resources to prevent it from bursting into the open, when it impacts all strata of the society and becomes only too apparent not only for the narrow circle of politicians privy to information, but to the whole population of the planet. My colleague did not agree with the statement that the dollar system has exhausted its potential, but argued that with the help of financial and bank instruments the illusion of wellbeing could be maintained indefinitely.

Let me emphasize that he not only knew the system inside out (probably, as well as Trotsky knew the Soviet system), but was also critical enough towards it, being aware that every system has its inherent faults, and none exists forever (each has a limited resource). With the faster pace of the historic process in the past decades, the lifetime of each system is measured at best in decades (by the time of our conversation, the Bretton Woods system had existed for 60 years and had already met with crises that resulted in its serious modifications).

I have never exceeded the limited amount of economic knowledge acquired in the political economy class offered in the history department of the Kiev University in 1987-1992 when I studied there.

That is why I always acknowledged the importance of the economics for the political decisions, but in my own evaluations of the political situation, including that in the economic sphere, preferred to rely on my knowledge of political mechanisms, which, by the way, could sometimes alter the economic reality beyond recognition.

How can that happen – the Ukrainian government gives us a demonstration. For 23 years, it has been acting against the national economic interests; having succeeded in almost completely eliminating the national economy, it set out to eliminate the population as well. Thus, the political force turned out to be stronger that the economic laws (the political power is incapable of making these laws work as it wishes, but can ignore them to the point of bringing about the complete breakdown of the state and society).

Therefore, I derived my conclusion that the dollar-based economy is already in crisis, and thus, pax Americana is also entering the crisis, from the evaluation of the processes in the post-Soviet territories undoubtedly initiated by the US. By that time, four attempts at "color" coups had taken place (two, in 2000-2001 and 2004-2005, in Ukraine, one in Georgia, and one in Kyrgyzstan). Three of them were successful. All of them were directed against Russia.

If the dollar economy were working normally, the US would not have any need to switch in its relations with Russia to the confrontational mode. What is important is that Washington, unlike its usual behavior, did not try to initiate economic war against Russia, but immediately engaged in the political, diplomatic, and informational confrontation, i.e. employed the mechanisms typically preceding the "hot" military hostilities or used in lieu of the latter, in the hope that the adversary can be made to capitulate without the use of military force.

It is no secret that at that time Russia was integrated into the American global financial-economic system and was making active attempt to get incorporated into the American military and political structure of the global dominance. What is more, Russia was willing to accept the role of a junior partner. The only obstacle was that being aware of its military (nuclear arsenal) and economical (unlimited natural resources), as well as positional (transit link through Eurasia) significance, Moscow wanted special partnership. That requirement in essence was aimed at occupying the position in the Washington political system a step above that of the EU.

The situation did not call for the sharp reaction on the part of the US. Within the existing system, Washington had an option of dragging the negotiations while playing for time and, at the opportune moment, hitting Russia with the "mercy strike" unexpectedly and instantly to destroy its economy the same way it destroyed the economy of Argentina or those of Asian "Tigers".

In general, if we assume that in 2005 the appearance of the US corresponded to the reality of the processes going on behind the façade, America did not need to pay for color revolutions. Strangling Russia in the embrace could have solved everything cheaper and more effectively. Assuming the risk of the political and diplomatic confrontation with Russia (which would be the inevitable result of organizing color coups) the US gained only one thing – time.

But time becomes the key factor in one situation only, when you realize that you are getting weaker faster than the normal pace of historic events gives you a chance to triumph over your adversary. Simply put, you need to vanquish him faster than he gets the opportunity to destroy you. In case of the US, sudden critical weakness could strike only due to the crisis of the dollar economy – every other aspect of the US power is derived from the mighty dollar.

Knowing that the US elites are no different than the Chinese, Russian or Madagascar elites in that they see the crisis only when it is already upon them (they receive all sort of forecasts and always believe more pleasant ones; which is, by the way, how all these "Rand Corporations" make their money) I draw the only possible conclusion. If as far back as in 2005 the US organized the attack on Russia at such a scale that it could not be possibly interpreted as something unintended, insignificant provocation, or the result of thoughtlessness of one or two departments, it means that the American elite is fully cognizant of the crisis. They started to spend resources in order to hide it from the world and, having the knowledge of the available resources and of how fast they are used up, could predict that the time of the crush is within one or two years.

By the way, considering the certainty of my colleague that with the help of the banking instruments and other financial manipulations the US could feel pretty safe until 2020 and correcting for his optimism of the liberal economist, I came to the conclusion that the inevitable collapse of the system will occur between 2015 and 2020. That is why I wrote at the time that the membership in the Customs Union would have allowed Yanukovych not only remain president until 2015, but even get reelected for another 5 years, after which the problem of the US would have gone away, and he would have been safe. For the same reason, I keep insisting for the past one and a half years that the military solution to the Ukrainian crisis is possible at any moment starting from winter of 2014 and up to the beginning of 2016 (with the earlier solution being more likely than the later one), whereas the political solution is possible no earlier than the end of 2016 – beginning of 2017. It could even be later than that, since until the US capitulates nothing will be settled, but the US will not go easily and will fight till the bitter end as the Third Reich. They have everything to lose, and they regret nothing and take pity on no one.

I want to stress one more time that these conclusions are not supported by the columns of statistical data, the size of the army or the number and quality of weaponry, data on the economical growth, etc. First, it is almost impossible to obtain precise figures. Most of the time, even the data available to the government offices for the internal use are imprecise. Second, the data are less important than their interpretation by those who make decisions. Since we have no information about the decisions made, orders issued, or operations initiated under the cover of secrecy, we can only evaluate the political situation based on the moves we observe.

That is, in life and the game of chess, in war and politics, every move crosses off one set of possible solutions and opens up another. The more moves you have made, the clearer you goals could be seen (after all, you always purposefully avoid something and equally purposefully seek something). At certain stages of a disease, a physician can, based only on the objective medical data, diagnose it sight unseen, determine the prognosis and even approximately tell how long the patient has left to live. The same is true in our case – all sides have made sufficient number of moves to cut themselves off from the possibility of retreat. The variations of the victory could be predicted at this stage of hostilities just as easily as it was to foretell the victory in the Great Patriotic war in April of 1943.

Let us consider the situation as it developed. When the US initiated the "color" attack on Russia, Moscow was unprepared to respond adequately in the political, economical or military spheres. Russia was completely incorporated into the dollar economy, and any attempt to damage the US economy would have resulted in the manifold amplified boomerang effect for the Russian economy. At the beginning of the 2000^th, the today's political stability could only be dreamed of – oligarchs were still fighting with the state for the real control over the country. At the same time, growing anti-oligarch sentiments in the society could have at any moment resulted in the popular "senseless and unmerciful" uprising, after which nothing would have been left of the state. The Northern Caucasus has not yet been stabilized; the country was facing the terrorist threat. And, finally, the only strength of the Russian army at the time was the nuclear arsenal, but it is not wise to start the nuclear war at the slightest provocation.

Thus, the Russian leadership started positional external fights sometimes retreating when it was entirely impossible to hold on, sometimes counter-attacking as, for example, in Georgia and Syria. Nevertheless, Moscow acted very carefully, avoiding suspicion of deliberate opposition to the American plans. Kremlin kept insisting on the partnership and accommodated American requests (like proving transit to Afghanistan). Public Russian diplomacy almost humiliated itself begging the West to return to the constructive dialog. Counter-intrigue with the establishment of Russia-friendly NGOs in the countries subjected to the "color" attacks were not apparent, and the undercover work with single structures was invisible and could not possibly counterbalance the massive actions of the US.

In general, the main goal was to gain time, preserve critically important strategic positions and reform the internal political and informational space, as well as the relationship between the Russian and global economical and financial systems in such a way that would give Moscow a chance to wrangle with Washington not only on equal terms but even with some tactical advantages. At the same time, clandestine work in the international field, or, simply put, the search for potential allies and preparation for alliances was being done. And the army was being trained and rearmed.

Actually, precisely these plans of rearming the army and navy prove to us that Russian leadership considered the period between 2015 and 2020 as critical. By 2015, the army was expected to achieve the ability to conduct one limited in time strategic operation in the European theater while providing security along the entire Russian border perimeter. By 2020, the army (judging by the timing of the delivery of weapons and equipment) will have reached the level of preparedness for the full-scale war in Europe.

In order to accomplish all this, it was necessary to convince the US that Russia will not breach the established relationships. In that sense, even the Moscow reaction to the Georgian aggression on South Ossetia was exquisitely measured and did not, it seems, raised serious suspicions in Washington. The use of the Russian troops after the attack on Russian peacekeepers was understandable to Washington. A government that refused to respond adequately in such a situation would lose the public support and might face the resentment in the military. That the Russians refrained from taking Tbilisi and destroying Georgian statehood also had a calming effect. Even more so, because at that time Medvedev was the president of Russia.

Let us recall a widely used not so long ago but now forgotten term "tandem". Before the association Putin-Medvedev emerged, Kremlin long demonstrated to the West a struggle between the liberals and "siloviki" (power ministries) scaring the US that if "siloviki" win, all hell would break loose. But the "liberals" won. By the way, I am convinced that in Moscow the liberals and "siloviki" honestly believed that they were engaged in an unrelenting struggle with each other (and did do it). Otherwise, the information would have leaked long ago that all this was just bluff. As the old chap Muller used to say: "In the Reich, you cannot believe anybody. But you can believe me". However, long before that sentence of Bronevoy from "17 moments of spring" movie, all well-known "political technologists" (from Shang Yang to Machiavelli) advised the rulers, if at all possible, not to share their plans with anybody, lest they become known to the enemy. As we know, better safe than sorry.

For four years, Washington was hoping that Medvedev would be reelected for the second term. That hope was not entirely groundless – they received the appropriate signals from Moscow. Only in 2012, when Putin returned to post of the president, and Medvedev, in spite all liberal hopes and rumors about fierce competition inside the "tandem", did nothing to stay in power, the Americans seemed to have begun to understand that they have been duped. But they were not entirely convinced. After all, the liberal government of Medvedev, so annoying to the patriots, still remained. Thus, the legend about the struggle between the liberals and patriots in the Putin's surroundings appeared still valid. Many in Russia still believe in it. But not in Washington, not anymore.

But it was too late. Russia has won the needed 10 years for itself. If in 2004 the US had organized a confrontation of the same intensity reached in 2014, Moscow would have had little chance to withstand it. At that time, the economic sanctions would not have passed almost unnoticed by the majority of the population; half of the today's allies would have been in the opposite camp, and the EU that today is openly sabotaging (at least, the "old Europe") the American "crusade", would have joined the anti-Russian ranks without a murmur. Also, the "fifth column" in Russia was still strong. And much more than that has been accomplished in ten years.

I know that it became to be in good taste to make fun of Putin's "clever plan", but I want to emphasize that the leadership acting without a strategic plan is hardly ever successful, particularly as successful and in such a critical situation. Russia of 2000 and Russia of 2015 are two different countries. If Putin has achieved such success without a plan, without a coordinated effort of a well-chosen team (even if not everybody on that team knew precisely what they were doing and why), if all of this is just a string of coincidences, then things are even better, since God himself is on Putin's side. Such remarkable number of coincidences could only be explained by a strategic plan, or by divine intervention, or both. Everyone is free to select the explanation he likes best.

What is important for us, though, is that Russia managed to postpone by almost ten years the major confrontation with America and used that time to prepare for such confrontation, albeit not completely. Let me say that Yanukovych alone failed to notice the preparation for the coup in Ukraine. The timing was obvious – 2015. The false start of the coup in 2013 was an unpleasant surprise not only for Moscow, but also for Washington. Russia was forced into a direct conflict with America earlier than expected. The US was not yet sufficiently worn out and Russia has not yet gained enough strength. Nevertheless, the situation in Ukraine in October-November of 2013 gave grounds for cautious optimism. Moscow could have won and would have won that round, if it had not been for the pathological cowardice, stupidity, and in the end betrayal of Yanukovych, complemented by the total incompetence and venality of his associates.

The military capabilities of the rapid response type were sufficient for the Crimea. We can only guess whether they would have been sufficient for the entire Ukraine. Many still think that such risk should have been taken. Unfortunately, those "many" never commanded anything bigger than the rebel battalion and never directed anything more significant than their own family. That risk could have turn out to be justified, but also could have led to very unpleasant consequences. That is why it is called "risk": it is impossible to calculate all possibilities, and the actions of other players are unknown. Thus, it is possible to gain big but also to lose just as big. In this case, Putin did not gamble – he was responsible for the fate of Russia. That is why he selected the surest option – to play for time.

Yes, the struggling Donbass gave Russia a gift of that extra year and paid for that year with its people's blood. Now the time has come not just to pay back out debts. What has come is the moment of truth. Russia could not have counted to stretch the game of cat and mouse with Washington to extend the period of respite beyond 2015. We should consider ourselves lucky as it is. Russia is much stronger now and freed itself from the detrimental dependence of the dollar economy. The US has weakened so much that the economists that only a few years ago authoritatively pronounced even a thought of opposing the US to be impossible, given the size of US GNP, all of a sudden changed their minds and now pompously argue whether the US economy would crash this years or in 2016, and how exactly that would happen.

And now, finally, I have come to these few paragraphs that were the objective of this entire article. All written above serves the purpose of clarifying the train of thought. Let me remind you that, in my opinion, politicians always have a number of options that would allow them to ignore the real economic situation and the real needs of the national economy and to make willful decisions that, nevertheless, would be carried out and often lead to catastrophic consequences.

I mentioned Ukraine as an example. I will once again remind you that in this country with eradicated economy, empty treasury, destroyed political and administrative systems, where mercenaries mixed with gangs act in place of police or National Guard, in the country torn apart by the civil war, the politicians (weak politicians, including in the intellectual sphere) remain in their positions for almost a year and a half despite the fact that all their decisions without exception go against the interests of Ukraine, the national economy, the survival of the population, and even common sense. This is due to the stability resource of the state, which keeps on going by inertia when the state structures are essentially dead. Like a chicken that runs for a few minutes after its head has been cut off.

Please, recall that Ukraine was pushed into a war by the US that did not even bother to conceal that what they needed was not the war of Kiev against Donbass, but the war of Kiev with Russia.

Currently the US is on the verge of economic collapse and, possibly, territorial disintegration due to the demise of the political and administrative structure. This scenario is real and America is facing it in the near future. Obama would be happy if that does not come to pass on his watch. Therefore, strategically the US lost the war to Russia without firing a single shot. However, Germany also strategically lost the War in 1943. That did not prevent Hitler from trying to win it tactically in the Battle of Kursk. We cannot say that such an attempt was completely without hope of success. Germans created a real threat and in places almost breached the front. The encirclement and destruction of the Kursk group of armies would have led to the loss of almost a third of the manpower and weapons that the USSR had at the front. That would have been the third massive defeat starting from 1941. The country's resources, including human, are not unlimited. Hitler simply tried to force the USSR to lose as much as in 1941 – manifold more soldiers than Germany. The losses at ratio of 5:1 would have bled the USSR dry before Germany lost the ability to resist, so it would have been necessary to seek peace with Hitler.

Similarly, the Americans are trying to tactically win the war they lost strategically. The main approach has not changed – Russia must be at war. Only now the EU is being recruited in addition to Ukraine, at least the Eastern European members. Those who do not believe this, try counting how many times during the past three months different politicians from various EU countries have declared that Europe does not want a war with Russia, particularly for Ukraine. When there is no danger of war, nobody talks about it. Have you heard anybody in Mongolia stating three times a day that they have no intentions of going to war with Russia?

Since neither I, nor you, Putin, Obama, anybody, except God, knows when the US economy collapses, in 2016 or in 2020 – the US needs to organize a war already this year. They will not fight directly, naturally (somebody else must pull chestnuts out of the fire for them). But the war must start – there is no other chance for the US to save itself.

That is why I am saying that once again we lack an extra year. Whatever happens with the dollar and the US economy, the Kiev regime has no chance to survive until 2016. It already survived twice as long as should be reasonably counted on. The crash of Ukraine, which became Stalingrad for the US – a symbolic place – defeat there would lead to the loss of face and catastrophic decline in its prestige (too much was invested by the US into the Kiev coup and the support of the Nazi regime, too deeply their allies were dragged into the crisis – in general, too much was involved), as well as automatic refusal of Europe to participate further in the American ventures. That is why Holland and Merkel helped Putin to play for time with Minsk-2. The loss of Europe would mean the loss of global dominance and crash of the US financial, economic and political system witnessed by the entire stunned humankind.

Considering that the Baltic limitrophe states are ready to share the fate of Ukraine, that a Maidan is being prepared for Belorussia for the purpose of partial engagement of the Russian resources, that Poland is being embroiled deeper and deeper in supporting Kiev, that the US is pushing Romania (jointly with Moldova) to repeat the "feat" of Saakashvili, only not in Ossetia but in Transnistria, – all the elements of the war to be initiated came together. The US will be coercing the old Europe into participating as the events unfold. What is important is to have at least one country-member of the EU officially at war with Russia.

Since there are the suicidal Baltics among the newly acquired members of the EU, the war is at our doorsteps. It may not happen. During the past years, the Russian leadership got the country out of such traps that nothing seems to be impossible. However, Russia never since 1945 came to a war as close as today.

We need to survive this summer. After that the danger of war should decline. Unfortunately, we are not the only ones who know that, and there is really no party of peace in Washington.